Abstract: Are banks that fail in banking panics the riskiest ones prior to the panics? The free banking era in the United States provides useful data to examine this question because the assets held by the banks were traded at the New York Stock Exchange. The authors estimate the ex ante riskiness of a bank's portfolio by examining the portfolio relative to mean-variance frontiers and by examining the bank's leverage and notes relative to assets. The authors find that the ex ante riskiness of a bank's portfolio helps predict which banks fail and the extent of noteholders' losses in the event of failure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Are banks that fail in banking panics the riskiest ones or are they just in the wrong place at the wrong time, in short "road kill"? Many discussions of banking panics and banking crises suggest that the riskiest banks are the ones most likely to fail. There is no doubt that the banks that fail are those most susceptible to the problems in the panic or crisis. Are these banks the ones that are most susceptible to problems? This question acquires some importance because banks are using value at risk to measure their riskiness, and banking regulators are encouraging banks to do so (Altman and Saunders 2001) . Correctly measured, it is hard to imagine a world in which reducing an individual bank's riskiness does not reduce its probability of failing (e.g. Wheelock and Wilson 1995; Kolari et al, 1999) . Nonetheless, is reducing an individual bank's riskiness likely to reduce the probability of failing in a banking panic or in a financial crisis?
In this paper, we examine whether a bank's ex ante riskiness is a reliable guide to its fate in a banking panic. In general, it is extremely difficult to tell whether the riskiest banks failed in a banking panic such as the Great Depression in the United States in the 1930s.
Banks' ex post exposures to the actual events invariably are clear after the fact, whether the events are the Depression in the 1930s, the Texas oil bust in the 1980s, or the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s. Nonetheless, banks generally hold nonmarketable assets and these assets' riskiness is far from apparent before the fact. In addition, it is hard to have much perspective on events that are so recent and clouded by political and other judgements.
Because of these problems with recent episodes, we use data from banking panics in 2 1 The notes issued by free banks were traded at less than par value at locations distant from the banks. There is virtually no useful information for our analysis because notes of continuing banks in a state generally were discounted at the same rate (Gorton 1996 (Gorton , 1999 Dwyer and Hasan 1999.)] 1860 to examine the importance of ex ante riskiness for banks' fates in a panic. There were runs on state banking systems in this period, which makes it possible to use these data to examine banks' fates in panics (Hasan and Dwyer 1994; Dwyer 1996; Dwyer and Hasan 1999) . The single most important predictor of which banks failed in the panics are their losses on bond portfolios (Economopoulos 1990; Hasan and Dwyer 1994; Dwyer 1996; Dwyer and Hasan 1999) . These bond portfolios were not an ancillary part of banks' business that happened to turn out badly. These state bonds were an integral part of the banks' business:
issuing banknotes that were used as currency by the public. The bonds were held as required backing for the banknotes. The ex ante riskiness of these bonds can be estimated from market prices of the bonds in trades on the New York Stock Exchange (Dwyer, Hafer and Weber 1999) . The availability of market prices before and after the panics makes it possible for us to estimate banks' ex ante riskiness in an important part of their business using standard financial tools. 1 Before presenting the empirical analysis, we briefly describe free banking in the United States. These free banks were not laissez faire banks; there were substantial legal restrictions on how banks operated. The banks were called free banks because there was no discretionary restriction of entry into banking, a business that revolved around issuing notes used as currency. These free banking systems were an innovation that succeeded chartered banking in 3 2 Selgin and White (1994) summarize the literature on laissez faire banking and discuss its relationship to the literature on historical banking systems. which a bank had to be granted an individual legislative charter to operate. 2 We also summarize the evidence on banking panics in the free banking period. While runs on banking systems occurred in various states in 1854, 1857 and 1860, the paucity of data for 1854 makes 1854 unlikely to be informative and the relatively few failures in 1857 make the 1857 panic useless for comparing failed banks with other banks. As a result, we focus on runs on selected state banking systems at the onset of the Civil War in 1860 in which many free banks failed.
In our empirical analysis, we estimate the riskiness of banks' bond portfolios relative to the mean-variance frontiers and find substantial support for the proposition that the ex ante riskiness of banks' portfolios is informative for predicting banks' fates. We also estimate banks' riskiness by their leverage and by their exposure to runs on notes. Banks are more likely to fail if they hold bond portfolios that are riskier ex ante or have a larger exposure to runs on notes.
II. FREE BANKING
Free banking in the United States began in 1837 when Michigan passed the first free banking law and ended in the 1860s when the federal government created the national banking system. This era in U.S. banking history has received a great deal of attention in recent years, partly to examine whether these relatively unregulated banks engaged in widespread fraud and partly to examine the implications of more recent banking regulation.
Because the federal government did not charter banks, all banks in the free banking period were state banks. Bank entry in states with free banking laws was not subject to 4 discretionary control and was easier than in states that did not have free banking laws (Economopoulos and O'Neill 1995) . In a free banking state, a bank could be opened and issue banknotes after satisfying specific, legislative requirements. These requirements included meeting minimum bank capital requirements and providing collateral for banknotes issued.
The aggregate balance sheets in Table 1 Many free banks failed. Research on free banking has focused on whether free banks that failed were primarily due to owners operating unsound banks -sometimes called "wildcat banks" -or to exogenous events. The general conclusion from the research is that banks generally were operated in a way that was consistent with the banks continuing operations absent some negative exogenous event (Rolnick and Weber 1984; Economopoulos 1988; Dwyer 1996 .) A related argument about free banking is a claim that banks would locate in remote areas "where the wildcats roam", thereby raising the cost of redeeming banknotes and of acquiring information about the banks. Dwyer (1996) examines this colorful view of banks' locations and finds evidence inconsistent with it after some experience with free banking.
The importance of exogenous events for explaining free banks' failures has received a great deal of attention. For example, Weber (1983, 1984) , Economopoulos (1988 Economopoulos ( , 1990 ), Hasan and Dwyer (1994) and Dwyer and Hasan (1999) examine the effects on free banks of the decline in southern bond prices at the onset of the Civil War. All of these authors find that holdings of southern bonds and losses on those bonds are important determinants of whether free banks remained open or ceased operations. Hasan and Dwyer (1994) and Dwyer and Hasan (1999) (Dwyer, Hafer and Weber 1999) . In 1857, relatively few banks failed (Dwyer 1996) . As a result, we concentrate on the runs in 1861 in Illinois and Wisconsin, in which many banks failed. We also include data from Indiana in 1861, which had fewer bank failures, as a contrast.
A. Bond Prices Figure 1 shows weekly data on bond prices from 1859 through 1862 for northern, border state and southern bonds from Dwyer, Hafer and Weber (1999 Ex post, a portfolio of southern bonds was risky in the sense that there were large losses on those bonds. The criticism that free banks were risky because they held risky portfolios is long-standing (Dowrie 1913; Krueger 1933; Hammond 1957) .
Ex ante, a portfolio of southern bonds may or may not have been particularly risky. to think that the omission of other bonds biases our results one way or the other. The omitted bonds tend to be northern bonds, but they are likely to be less liquid precisely because they are not trading often enough to create a useful record. Overall, we think that it is better to omit the bonds on which we have no data than to make unfounded assumptions about the first and second moments of returns.
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5 These frontiers are more informative than alternatives which we examined based on only 13 weeks of returns or as many as 52 weeks of returns. 6 The only United States government securities for which prices are available are long-term bonds. These long-term bonds are included in the portfolios. 7 While it might be desirable to examine the weights of individual securities, standard estimation procedures estimated the weights imprecisely relative to the frontier (Best and Grauer 1991; Britten-Jones n.d.) . The frontiers in Figure 2 have rough parabolic shapes. The implication that an efficient frontier must be parabolic relies on unrestricted weights of various securities, and the frontiers in Figure 2 are estimated subject to the restriction that bond holdings be nonnegative. We impose this restriction because banks being short bonds is not consistent with the laws of this period or with the bonds being held as backing for notes. We also do not include a risk-free asset because very few banks held the risk-free asset -gold or silver that paid zero interest -as backing for their notes. 6 The frontiers show the dramatically worsening situation in terms of both the portfolios' returns and standard deviations. By April 1861, none of the bonds has a positive return for the prior 26 weeks. 7 The returns for the next half year, from April 1861 to October 1861, range up 10 8 In Illinois, a bank is counted as closed or failing if there is no balance sheet information in the October 1861 report or it is reported to be ceasing operations in that report. In Indiana, a bank is counted as closed or failing if it is reported to be ceasing operations in the January 1862 report. In Wisconsin, a bank is counted as closed or failing if there is no balance sheet information in the January 1862 report or it is reported to be ceasing operations in that report. 9 Fourteen of the ninety banks in the left panel of Figure 3 closed, and the bank with the highest return in that figure is one that closed.
The analysis in this figure reflects only information on what noteholders were paid by the state banking regulator. Noteholders may have received more payments, because banks had other assets and stockholders were liable for up to twice the book value of capital in the bank. Information on such payments is relatively difficult to acquire though because it is likely to be available only in the courthouses of the counties in which banks were located if the information exists at all. Leverage is another measure of risk, which can be measured in a variety of ways. We measure leverage by the ratio of bonds to capital in Figure 4 because this measure of leverage reflects the risk borne by stockholders for a given standard deviation of returns. Figure 4 is similar to We use a maximum likelihood estimator developed by Dwyer and Hasan (1999) (Poirier 1980; Maddala 1983; Meng and Schmidt 1985) The measures of ex ante risk that we use are related to a bank's bond portfolio and leverage. The leverage that matters to owners of a bank is the ratio of bonds to equity capital.
The lower this ratio, the more the losses that will be absorbed by stockholders before a bank has a negative book value of capital. Noteholders care about a different measure of leverage:
the amount of bonds backing their notes. The maximum amount of notes that banks could issue was limited by the amount of bonds, but there was no minimum amount of notes that could be issued. All else the same, the more bonds held by a bank given its note issue, the higher the redemption rate on a bank's notes. As an additional measure of risk, our statistical analysis includes the exposure of a bank to a run on its notes, measured by the ratio of notes to assets.
Because we know that there was a run on banknotes in 1861, this measure of risk of exposure to a run on notes may be an ex post measure of risk and not an ex ante measure, which means that caution is required in interpreting it as a measure of ex ante risk.
In our statistical analysis, we use the returns on banks' portfolios for the 26 weeks ending in May 1860. These data from late 1859 and early 1860 are prior to Lincoln's nomination and are unlikely to reflect the full effects of Lincoln's nomination, his election, the secession of southern states and the subsequent outbreak of war. We measure the banks' portfolios using both the mean weekly return and the weekly return's standard deviation.
Figure 3 also suggests that deviations from the efficient frontier may be important, possibly due to managerial inefficiency, an argument related to that in Wheelock and Wilson (1995) .
We measure a bank's deviation from the frontier alternatively by the horizontal, vertical and Euclidian distances from the frontier. Gorton's (1996) evidence on the riskiness of new banks. Population density is included in both equations because low population density may be associated with remote locations and wildcat banking. Finally, we include the asset size of each bank in both equations, which may be associated with the bank's reputation, stability or other factors. It is plausible that larger banks are more likely to stay open and have higher redemption rates than smaller banks when they do close, although there is no strong theoretical reason to expect any particular relationship.
Portfolio Riskiness
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12 The value of notes, losses relative to notes and losses relative to capital are all measured in dollars per dollar. The population density is measured as persons per acre. 13 Dwyer and Hasan (1999) report a similar finding. Table 3 The control variables' estimated coefficients in Table 3 Ex ante risk is important in these estimates. The standard deviation of the rate of return on a bank's bond portfolio is statistically significant. The Chi-square test statistic for the standard deviation in both equations is 8.01 with two degrees of freedom, which has a p-value of 1.8 percent. The Chi-square for the mean return in both equations is smaller, 4.63, with a p-value of 9.9 percent. Because the equations in Table 3 include the ex post losses in addition to the ex ante return and standard deviation, the statistical insignificance of the mean return may reflect nothing more than the superiority of hindsight over foresight. Table 4 presents estimates with the ex post losses on the bond portfolios deleted from the equations. To overcome a problem of nonconvergence of the estimation algorithm, the estimates in Table 4 are conditional on a correlation of the errors of 0.95, which is roughly the same as the estimate in Table 3. 14 The estimates without ex post losses provide substantial support for the informativeness of a bank's ex ante riskiness. A bank's ex ante riskiness is measured by the standard deviation of the portfolio's return, the mean return, the bank's leverage and its exposure to a run on notes. Both the standard deviation and the mean return are statistically significant in each equation and also are jointly significant in both equations. There is also support in Table 4 for leverage's importance, even though neither the coefficient of bonds relative to capital nor the 18 15 The correlation of the loss per dollar of notes and the standard deviation of the portfolio's return is 0.19, smaller in magnitude. coefficient of bonds relative to notes is statistically significant. The Chi-square test statistic for both coefficients being zero simultaneously is 10.293 which has a p-value of 0.5 percent. In addition, the concentration of a bank on the note business clearly lowers the bank's present value and the noteholders' redemption rate in the event of a run on notes.
The estimated coefficients in Table 4 do, however, suggest a problem with the mean return. Both estimated coefficients of the mean return are positive, the opposite of what would be expected if a higher mean return suggests more risk and is associated with a lower probability of continuing in business. Positive coefficients are more consistent with the mean return being a measure of a bank's losses. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the return is statistically significant at the five percent significance level in Table 4 without the ex post loss but not in Table 3 . The correlation between the mean return on the bond portfolio for the 26 weeks ending in April 1860 and the loss per dollar of notes, included in Table 3 , is -0.526. 15 This negative correlation is consistent with the mean return being an imperfect proxy for the later loss but hardly sufficient to be sure.
A big difference between banks that failed and banks that did not fail is the lower return even in April 1860 for banks that failed, a point evident in Figure 3 . This appears as vertical deviations from the efficient frontier in that figure. These deviations from the efficient frontier may be due to unexpected decreases in the prices of bonds, decreases that continued into 1861
and resulted in the demise of many banks; they also may simply reflect inefficiency on the part of many insufficiently diversified banks.
No matter what the verdict is about the usefulness of the mean return, the equations in Table 3 with the ex post return deleted suggest that ex ante risk is important. The standard deviation of returns still helps to predict whether a bank remains open and the redemption rate if the mean return is deleted from the equations. The Chi-square test statistic for the standard deviation's coefficients in both equations being zero is 11.54 with two degrees of freedom and a p-value of 0.3 percent. A bank's leverage appears to be informative, although the economic significance of the results is not obvious. The coefficient of leverage in the present value equation is positive and the coefficient in the note equation is negative; the anomalous positive coefficient is quite statistically significant and the expected negative coefficient has a p-value of 75.6 percent. Notes relative to assets, on the other hand, are informative: the p-value for both negative coefficients of notes relative to assets being zero is 0.08 percent.
The association between a bank's standard deviation and its fate as well as noteholders' losses is clear evidence that the ex ante riskiness of a bank's bond portfolio helps to predict whether a bank fails. The importance of exposure to a run on notes bolsters the result for the standard deviation. Even so, it is worthwhile to explore the association between the mean return and a bank's fate, in part because it may be associated with ex ante inefficiency of banks' portfolios. Figure 3 suggests that deviations from the efficient frontier may be important for predicting which banks fail. The two panels of Table 3 The bottom panel of Table 3 shows tests based on using Euclidian distance to measure deviations from the frontier. The Euclidian distance is the minimum distance to the frontier from the bank's mean return and the standard deviation of its return. This measure of distance is statistically significant with a p-value of 1.4 percent. This provides some support for the importance of deviation from the frontier, although this measure of distance reflects the vertical deviation in addition to the horizontal deviation. Overall, we conclude that deviation from the frontier may be important, but the unimportance of horizontal deviations of a bank's standard deviation from the efficient standard deviation leaves a large measure of doubt.
Portfolio Inefficiency
V. CONCLUSION
Greater ex ante riskiness helps to predict a bank's fate, at least in this banking panic.
Not surprisingly, a bank's ex post loss on its bond portfolio helps to predict its fate. The ex ante variability of a bank's portfolio also consistently helps predict its fate and the redemption rate. While the importance of the standard deviation is the strongest evidence for the importance of ex ante risk, this is not the only evidence. We find that a bank's exposure to runs on notes is associated with the likelihood of failure and noteholders' losses. There is a 21 clear association between a bank's mean return on its portfolio well before the panics and the final outcomes, but this is clouded by the correlation of the mean return and the later ex post loss. The relationship between the Euclidian distance from the frontier and the outcomes is the strongest evidence that an inefficient portfolio of bonds contributed to the likelihood of failure and noteholders' losses.
The evidence in this paper is based on one episode, but it is a fairly typical banking panic with atypical data available. An exogenous event occurred that raised questions about the ability of the banks to honor their obligations and a run on the banks ensued. We find that riskier banks were more likely to fail and holders of notes in such banks were more likely to suffer losses. In this panic, measures of risk based on typical, everyday events are informative about outcomes associated with an atypical event -a banking panic.
We conclude that predicting the fate of a bank in a banking panic may be like predicting the fate of a person crossing the road. Generally it's a car that you don't see that hits you, but a person who crosses more prudently is less likely to get hit. 
